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Abstract 
Spinoff firms are exceptional performers across industries. The causes for the 
emergence of spinoff firms are widely investigated in the literature. However, the 
role of teams for spinoffs has received little scholarly attention. On one hand, 
talented individuals may find it necessary to team up with others to utilize 
complementary knowledge and generate synergies. On the other hand, some types 
of team production environments may have dissonance and motivate individuals to 
leave the team. The present study demonstrates that organizational synergies and 
dissonance can be incorporated into appropriate specifications of team production 
functions. This framework explains the necessity to form a team, stability of teams, 
and the emergence of different types of spinoffs depending on specific 
organizational arrangements.  
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1  Introduction 
A team consists of individuals, with different talents, who work together to fulfill a well 
defined objective. Team production offers several advantages. In particular, individuals 
within  the  team  acquire  deifferent  knowledge  sets,  offer  their  expertise  to  others  as 
required,  learn  from  each  other,  and  internalize  organizational  goals  [e.g.,  deVaro  and 
Kutrulas (2006) and Garicano (2000,p.878)].  In addition to providing access to knowledge 
for immediate projects, teams may also become important sources of new product ideas.
1 
Recent studies suggest that innovations, that require extensive knowledge, are by necessity 
a result of team effort [e.g., (Wuchty et al., 2007; Jones, 2009)]. Large teams with diverse 
talents can also prevent other competitive firms from having access to certain types of 
critical expertise. This provides some monopoly advantages to the team. In general, team 
members share common goals and are interdependent for achieving these goals. Such an 
organizational  mechanism  has  become  a  necessity  to  attract  the  requisite  diversity  of 
talents for corporate success (Milliken et al., 2003; Jones, 2009).
2 
     A team can be said to exhibit organizational synergies if the expected output from team 
work exceeds the sum of outputs that the individuals can produce on their own. Synergies 
may arise primarily due to voluntary compliance of team members to organizational goals 
[e.g., Milliken et al (2003), Cornqvist et al (2006), and Magni et al (2009)]. Another source 
of synergy may be the experience in founding similar spinoff teams, cooperating with other  
firms  in  the  commercialization  process,  or  close  relationships  with  other  firms.
3     
Realizing  potential  synergies  in  practice,  however,  seem  to  require  two  preconditions. 
First, as Garicano and Hubbard (2009) argued, team members prefer autonomy as far as 
possible. Hence, team members comply readily and create synergies if they know why 
                                                 
1For all practical purposes teams perform an entrepreneurial role in so far as they 
contribute to innovation, implementation, and risk sharing.  
2 There is a fairly general agreement that teams with diverse talents are often more 
creative compared to homogeneous teams. Beckman (2006) noted that team 
composition and members’ prior affiliations shape new firm behavior. If team 
members worked at many different companies they bring unique ideas and contacts 
that encourage innovation. Homogenous teams manage incremental implementation 
better while heterogeneous teams are more innovative. 
    
3 Cohen and Bailey (1997), Wong et al (2007), and Krabel and Mueller (2009) identified                  
many other sources of such synergies.   
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certain  decisions  are  taken  or  participate  in  the  decsion  making  process.  Second,  the 
willingness to cooperate depends on the perception of equity in sharing gains. As Dessein 
et al (2007) pointed out, compensation to team members should depend on their production 
effort and the time spent on coordination. For all practical purposes potential synergies can 
be realized only if every team member offers his best effort to do his specific job and all 
the team members understand, accept, and execute team related work efficiently. 
Teams are formed to create synergies. However, some disadvantages of team production 
are  discernible.  First,  as  Danzon  et al.  (2005)  noted,  there  may  be  organizational 
dissonance as the team size increases. Coordination costs increase as team size increases 
partly due to the energy that must be utilized to resolve disagreements. Team size affects 
the  incidence  of  spinoffs  for  another  reason.  Large  teams  produce  only  incremental 
innovations.  For,  they  have  to  devote  much  of  their  R&D  effort  to  maintain  the 
competitiveness  of  existing  products.  Further,  their  core  competencies  may  limit  their 
efficient product line choice. Small teams are a bigger source of supply of new ideas and 
products [e.g.,  Hyytinen and Maliranta (2008), Elfenbein et al (2009), and others]. In 
general, the low percapita rate of spinoff from large firms is one of the stylized facts that 
Klepper (2009) acknowledges. 
Second, teams that have autonomy of decision making tend to emphasize their satisfaction 
at work while neglecting the viability of the team. In addition, as Fulghieri and Hodrick 
(2006)  noted,  autonomous  individuals  may  choose  activities  where  they  cannot  be 
displaced rather than choose the most profitable activities for the team. Third, an increase 
in team size brings about the possibility of free riding by individual members of the team. 
Following  Alchian  and  Demsetz  (1972)  and  Klein  et  al  (1978),  it  may  be  noted  that 
benefits of shirking accrue to the individual while the disadvantages and expenses must be 
borne by everybody in the team. Carpenter et al (2009) provide further analysis along these 
lines. 
 
A team is efficient and stable only when organizational synergies can be achieved. The 
lack of synergy  signals possibilities of spinoffs by team members (Rose, 2002). They may 
find it advantageous to leave the team and start a firm on their own rather than working in 
a  team  exhibiting  organizational  dissonance.  One  of  the  earliest  studies  of  this  nature, 
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Cooper (1985), noted that a worker of any level of talent may leave the team and start a 
spinoff if he has difficulties of an organizational nature while working in a large team. 
Similarly, Wiggins (1995) pointed out that there may be limits to team size depending on 
the occurrence of organizational dissonance. 
      New ideas are another driver of spinoffs. With the accumulation of knowledge and 
expertise  over  time  team  members  get  new  ideas.  These  new  ideas  may  be  process 
innovations,  i.e.,  better  and  more  efficient  ways  of  doing  existing  tasks.  In  general,  a 
process innovation is likely to be implemented within the team so long as it does not 
disrupt existing assembly lines extensively. Very good ideas from team members will be 
generally accepted and implemented within the existing team structure simply due to their 
superior economic value. Team members with good ideas will be adequately compensated 
to retain them in the team [e.g., Chaterjee and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)]. New ideas may be 
new lines of products that can be produced and offered on the market profitably. However, 
the existing team may not implement new product ideas if they cannibalize the market for 
their existing product.  
 If the new idea comes from the most talented individual in the team. He may be inhibited 
from spinning off if he has to undertake the costly formation of a new team which does not 
promise an increase in his returns. Lower talented members of the team may not get new 
ideas. Even if low talented people have ideas, they tend to stay in the team since they do 
not  have  the  requisite  resources  to  organize  a  new  team.  More  likely  than  not,  once 
individuals  with  intermediate  level  talents  are  convinced  that  spinoff  would  be  more 
advantageous, they will leave the team.
4  
     Thus the literature on spinoffs generally acknowledges the following. The emergence of 
an innovative idea which is quite distinct from the current activities of the team. There is 
always a possibility that team management can and does accommodate the innovation. 
Hence,  to  justify  a  spinoff  there  must  be  disagreement  with  the  team.  This  is  another 
                                                 
4  Cassiman and Ueda (2006) suggest that this pattern emerges whenever the original 
team does not have the organizational capacity to internalize large innovative projects. 
The possibility of cannibalization of existing products and the inability to develop new 
markets add to their decision to reject the implementation of some fairly large 
innovative ideas [e.g., Klepper and Sleeper (2005).] 
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important  driver  of  spinoff  [e.g.,  Klepper  and  Sleeper  (2005);  Klepper  and  Thompson 
(2010)]
5.  
     Neither  of  these  forces,  viz.,  new  ideas  and  disagreements,  provide  a  satisfactory 
explanation  for  spinoffs  (Shrivastava2010).  The  individual  who  contemplates  an  exit 
should have the entrepreneurial talent which includes managerial skills and willingness and 
ability  to  take  risks  [e.g.,  van  Praag  and  Cramer  (2001)  and  Fraser  and  Greene 
(2006),Shrivastava2010]. It also includes the ability to manage the supply chain efficiently 
to reduce the costs of producing a given volume of output. Someone in the team must also 
understand customer needs and have the marketing capabilities to maximize sales revenue 
(Van der Panne et al., 2003; Agarwal et al., 2004). The ability to raise requisite finances 
[e.g., (Gompers et al., 2005; Wong et al., 2007)] and the ability to assemble the requisite 
team [(Boning et al., 2007; deVaro and Kurtulus, 2006; Jones, 2009)] are other important 
factors  to  introduce  a  new  product.  All  the  entrepreneurial  characteristics  required  to 
undertake an activity constitute entrepreneurial talent.
6  
     Another aspect of spinoffs has been noted. An employee, who has a new and innovative 
idea, may prefer to leave the team and start a new enterprise on his own. Klepper (2009) 
and elsewhere designates this as involuntary spinoff in so far as the original team did not 
initiate  it.  Buenstorf  (2009)  considers  this  to  be  an  opportunity  spinoff.  It  is  always 
possible that the individual leaves the team only after his idea is rejected. In a basic sense 
the original team can be said to have initiated the spinoff voluntarily. This is one aspect of 
necessity spinoffs in the sense of Buenstorf (2009). A different situation may arise. The 
original team may decide to implement a new idea. However, the innovator may feel that 
the implementation is at an inefficient level. This may be one mechanism through which 
the team forces the individual to form a spinoff. It has dimensions of both an involuntary 
                                                 
5  Property rights of the employee and the compensation he receives for innovative ideas 
do matter both for the generation of new ideas and spinoff. In general, as soon as an 
individual feels that he has a new and implementable idea, he may leave the team and 
develop it independently. For, otherwise, covenants may bind him to assign property 
rights to the team and prevent him from getting an acceptable share of returns. We will 
examine this in detail in future work. 
6 As Ferrante (2005) suggests, entrepreneurial talent consists of the ability to discover, 
select, process, interpret and use the data necessary to make decisions under risk. 
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spinoff and a necessity spinoff. Theoretical explanations of spinoffs must acknowledge all 
these possibilities. 
The  team  production  function  captures  the  extent  to  which  team  members  are 
independent or interrelated to each other within the team. This suggests that the nature of 
team  production,  viz.,  whether  or  not  it  exhibits  synergies,    has  a  crucial  role  in 
determining the stability of a team or the likelihood of spinoffs. It also has a determining 
influence on who leaves the team. Magni et al. (2009) is one of the earlier empirical studies 
that emphasized the absence of team synergies as possible causes of spinoff even though 
they did not offer any theoretical analysis to justify it. Hence, section 2 will be devoted to a 
specification of team production functions. Section 3 then considers the nature of these 
functions that exhibit organizational synergy or dissonance and identifies organizational 
dissonance as a determinant of team stability and spinoffs.
7 
Further, the owner of the team may ask some members to leave either because of 
dissonance  or  if  their  contributions  to  the  profit  of  the  team  are  not  satisfactory.  The 
owners  may  also  encourage  some  members  to  create  an  independent  spinoff  if  higher 
synergies can be achieved.
8 In section 4, the emphasis is on the nature of the production 
functions prior to spinoffs. It offers a general analysis of the sources and the nature of 
spinoffs that occur. The differences in the nature of the production functions prior to and 
after spinoff have been identified as another determining aspect in the spinoff process. 
Quality of ideas as a source of spinoff will be discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents 
three  classic  examples  to  illustrate  the  validity  of  the  theoretical  results  of  this  study. 
Therefore  the  strength  of  the  production  function  approach  of  this  study  is  that  it 
encompasses a variety of empirically observed practices. Several aspects of spinoffs from 
teams which need a different analytical framework are discussed in the concluding section.  
                                                 
7  There may be no essential synergies or dissonance if different talents are working 
together. Buenstorf and Fornahl (2009) call this feature modularity. Under these 
conditions all the talents working together have no essential gains. Each of them can 
operate on their own. 
8 The original firm may, on its own, split the team, leave essential management to the 
individual teams, and derive profits from the new organizational structure. This is also 
a form of spinoff. See, for example, Barrett (2003) and Mireault (2003). 
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2  Team Production 
The  primary  interest  in  developing  an  organizational  production  function  is  to  explain 
stability  of  teams  or  spinoffs  from  it
9.  Hence,  a  short  run  specification,  assuming  that 
capital equipment is already in place and not substitutable with labor, is more appropriate. 
Owners of capital will be residual claimants of profits generated by the team
10. However, 
the team consists of individuals of diverse talents and they may be substitutable to varying 
degrees. Team members may be predisposed to cooperate, contribute to team goals, and 
generate synergies. Similarly, the possibility of substitution may motivate them to comply 
with team goals and contribute to the expected synergies. In general, a combination of 
these two forces explains the emergence of synergies or the lack of it.  
Assume that a team comprises of individuals with n talents. It is reasonable to postulate 
that there will only be few persons at the highest level of talent (n) and the largest number 
of workers will have the lowest talent. Let x
j; j = 1,2,…,n denote the number of individuals 
with talent j. Then, by assumption, x
j−1>x
j for all j = 2,3,…,n. Further, x
n = 1 will be 
postulated.
11 
     The organizational production function can be written as 
  y = (∑xj
β)
α/β 
where y = output, and 0 < α,β < 1. 
                                                 
9  It will be assumed that the team is producing only one product. Such an assumption 
enables us to focus on team formation and the resulting synergies. If the team produces 
many products some synergies will be due to an appropriate choice of product range. It 
poses a different set of problems. 
10 The results will hold even if one member of the team owns these assets. This aspect 
destracts us from theme of the study and increases the complexity in making 
comparisons of teams before and after spinoff. 
11 It may be argued that individuals from group j will have a productivity a
j and that it 






j for all j = 
2,3,…,n can still be maintained without any loss of generality. Another way of 
justifying the specification is to measure the units of x
j in such a way that the 
productivity of x
j is the same for all j. The results that we develop in the rest of the 
study will not change in any way. 
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This production function exhibits an elasticity of substitution σij = 1/(1-β) for all i ≠ j = 
1,2,…,n. See Uzawa (1962)
12.   
    If there is an indication that two or more individuals working together will be more 
beneficial
13.  Under  such  conditions  the  production  process  is  such  that  the  degree  of 
substitution between them is low. They may generate synergies on their own volition in 
order to share the gains. Similarly, if the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1 team 
members  tend  to  cooperate  for  fear  of  being  displaced.  This  may  also  be  a  source  of 
synergy. However, if σ = 1 team members do not have any motivation to cooperate and the 
management of the team may consider it cheaper to displace errant workers rather than 
coordinate their work and hope that synergies can be achieved. 
     In  general,  this  production  function  exhibits  synergies  whenever  σ  ≠  1.  The  Cobb-
Douglas function represents the lowest possible level of output for given xj; j = 1,2,…,n
14.  
A general proof of this result can be developed as follows. Note that 
(∑xj
β)
1/β > π xj
1/n whenever (∑xj
β) > π xj
β/n. However, (∑xj
β) > (∑xj
β )/n  > πxj
β/n 
for the simple reason that the arithmetic mean of xj
β ; j = 1,2,…,n is always greater than 
their geometric mean when xj ≠ 1 for all j. 
     Consider the possibility that some shirking and free riding is possible whatever may be 
the value of β. Output will then decrease. This can be reflected by the specification of α
15. 
For,  notice  that  if  team  members  are  not  predisposed  to  cooperation  and/or  cannot  be 
                                                 
12  Observe that this embeds the Cobb-Douglas functional form. For, σ tends to 1 when 
β tends to zero. 
13  Following Adam Smith’s notions of division of labor it may be claimed that 
individuals, pursuing their self interest, improve the efficiency of the organization. On 
the other hand, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that two or more individuals 
working together create synergies. As their example suggests, each one of two 
individuals may not be in a position to lift heavy equipment from a truck but they can 
do so collectively. For analytical purposes this implies that neither the composition of 
x
j nor the size of β can fully reflect the occurrence of organizational synergies. 
14  Unfortunately this fundamental property of the CES production function was 
neglected due to the overemphasis on the elasticity of substitution. 
15  In this specification α represents synergies for given xj. The usual interpretation of 
economies of scale aplies only when all xj change proportionately. Arrow et al 
(1961,p.247) acknowledged such amibiguity in the returns to scale interpretation. 
Another important aspect of this specfication may be noted. In general, it will be 
expected that α < 1 even when α > β. That is, organizational production functions 
exhibit decreasing returns to scale even if that interpretation is pursued. 
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induced to comply then the synergies expected from β cannot materialize. In particular, 
note that if all xj operate independently they produce an output 
y* = ∑xj
β > 1. If they form a team the resulting output is greater than y* if and only if α > 
β. Hence, α = β corresponds to the case where team members voluntarily offer only that 
much  cooperation  as  is  warranted  by  the  elasticity  of  substitution.  In  general, 
organizational dissonance is signalled whenever α < β. 
     This  specification  of  the  organizational  production  function  suggests  that  β  ≠  0, 
reflecting the elasticity of substitution, and α > β, indicating  the predisposition of team 
members  to  comply  with  team  goals,  are  the  basic  sources  of  organizational  synergy. 
However  β  ≠  0  cannot,  by  itself,  guarantee  the  emergence  of  synergies.  This  is  the 
foundation on which spinoffs from teams can be conceptualized. 
     Note that the existence of synergies is a property of the entire team. On the otherhand, 
any spinoff decision of an individual of talent j will depend on his returns alone. He can be 
expected to leave the team if he expects to receive more compared to what he can if he 
remains within the team. Fundamentally, the disagreements pertain to sharing of gains. 
Three possible sharing concepts are discerinble. First, α < β enables the team to pay each 
individual his marginal product and leave some positive profit to the owner of capital. The 
team may, in fact, implement this mechanism. Second, each individual’s contribution to 
output can be viewed as consisting of output from his personal effort to deliver output and 
his contribution to team effort leading to synergies. The payments to an individual may 
then depend on both these factors.
16 Third, suppose an individual comes up with a new 
idea. The team will implement it if synergies are expected. Further, the level at which it is 
implemented will depend on the perception of the owner of capital regarding its market 
potential. There can be information asmmetry and disagreement if the market potential of 
the idea is private information of the individual who created it and the owner of capital 
experiences information asymmetrty. Under these conditions disagreements may arise with 
respect to the market potential and the contractual payments for the indvidual who created 
the new idea. These aspects must be kept in perspective while examining the prpensity of 
an individual to spinoff from a team. The rest of the analysis will assume that individuals 
                                                 
16  Some aspects pertaining to contractual sharng have been examined in Adams (2005), 
Autrey (2005), deVaro and Kurtulus (2006), and Dessein et al (2007). 
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are paid their marginal products. Contractual payment mechanisms necessitate a somewhat 
different analysis though the fundamental insights regarding spinoffs remain the same. 
3  Team Formation and Stability  
To begin with, observe that there must be reasons why an individual agrees to be a part of 
a team in the first place. The purpose of this section is to analyze the conditions under 
which there will be a possible rearrangement of teams. However, it must be noted that the 
new team must require the talents of both the teams. They should be willing to cooperate 
post merger. This is precondition to achieve the desired synergy in the combined team. 
Proposition 1: The emergence of diminishing returns to individual effort and the possibility 
of creating synergies from team formation are central to its emergence. 
Proof: Let individuals of only talent j produce the output to begin with. It is obvious that 
such an organization will experience diminishing returns. Let the output be 
y = xj
β ; β < 1. Each of the individuals receives a wage, wj = βxj
β-1   
They may expect to use their talents more efficiently if they form a team with individuals 
of another talent k. The emergence of synergies can be represented by the production 
function, y = (xj
β + xk
β)
α/β ; α > β 




α/β – 1 
Observe that wjt > wj whenever α > β and xj,xk > 1. The possibility of deriving benefits 
from synergies is at the apex of team formation and its stability in general. Note that α < 1 
is a distinct possibility. Hence, there is an acknowledgement that bigger teams may also 
experience  diminishing  returns.  As  a  result,  the  search  for  synergies  through  team 
expansion continues. 
     Within this framework, the team and its organizational structure will remain stable if 
each  individual  with  different  talents  receives  the  maximum  wages  they  can  (say,  in 
comparison to what they can earn in other organizational forms) and the owners of capital 
consider the profit generated to be adequate to cover the cost of capital per unit of time. 
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Any one individual will leave the team if he has the entrepreneurial ability to organize a 
different, but perhaps a smaller, team which enables him to earn higher wages.  
Proposition 2 Teams that experience organizational synergies are not likely to spawn 
spinoffs.  
Proof: Recall that α > β for β ≠ 0 is the only way to assert the existence of organizational 
synergies. Consider the production function,  y = (∑xj
β)
α/β; α > β. The wages paid to a 
worker of talent j will be wj = α (∑xj
β)
α/β – 1 xj
β – 1, i = 1,2,…,jn. The owner of capital assets 
receives p = (1−α)y. If an individual of talent j contemplates a spinoff, he has to form a 
team of individuals of talent k = 1,2,…, j. Suppose he can assemble such a team without 
sacrificing any synergy
17. After the spinoff, he expects to receive wjs = α (∑xk
β )
α/β – 1 xj
β – 1 
Note that, w
js≤w
j with the equality holding only for the individuals of the highest talent. 
From this it can be inferred that none of the team members will have any motivation to 
spinoff as long as the team maintains its synergy. 
Proposition 3 Suppose α = β and such teams are formed.  They are not likely to spawn 
spinoffs.  
Proof: When α = β the production function reduces to 
y = (∑xj
α) 
Buenstorf  and  Fornahl  (2006)  designate  this  as  modularity.  In  such  situations  team 
members will be indifferent between working independently or forming a team.However, 
they  may  work  as  a  team  in  the  following  cases.  First,  xj  may  need  to  share  capital 
equipment. It may be efficient for a coordinator to allocate capital and allow each team 
member to function independently. This is the classic M-Form organization. Second, if 
they operate independently there may be costs of coordinating their outputs to produce a 
marketable  product.  The  costs  of  coordinaion  by  market  forces  may  far  exceed  the 
benefits. They prefer to form a team. The payments to individual members of the team are 
the marginal products they contribute. When a team is formed wage paid to a worker of 
talent j = w
j = αx
α−1
j  which is independent of the contributions of others. Suppose an 
                                                 
17  Shrivastava (2010) argued that this is a necessary condition. A spinoff is not possible 
without it even if there is lack of synergy in the original team and an individual of 
talent j experiences a disagreement with team management. 
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individual of talent j can operate his own team.  He will still receive wj = αxj
α-1. , He has 
nothing to gain if modularity persists. In such a case, spinoff will not be advantageous at 
all. 
      The following observation is pertinent. Proposition 1 suggests that individuals tend to 
form bigger teams if it is possible to achieve organizational synergies. Propostions 2 and 3 
indicate that such teams remain stable so long as organizational synergies persist. 
      Suppose,  instead,  that  the  team  of  n  talents  exhibits  lack  of  synergy.  This  can  be 
represented by α < β. In such a case, it can be expected that one or more individuals of 
talent j will spinoff and form a different team. 
In sum, if a team exhibits organizational dissonance apriori, every individual in the 
team  is  better  off  if  he  spins  off.  Even  individuals  of  low  talent  may  prefer  self-
employment rather than working in a team exhibiting dissonance. At best, individuals with 
the highest talent may be indifferent between staying in or spinning off unless they can 
form a team with higher synergy. 
The above analysis considered the possibility of an individual team member identifying 
improvements in synergies and then destabilizing the team. It is possible that the owner of 
the team initiates the ouster of team member(s) whose contribution is less than what they 
are paid or without whom the rest of the team may gain synergies.
18 This will be elucidated 
in the following propositions. 
Proposition 4 A team member will be asked to leave if his contribution to profit is less 
than the cost of capital necessary to continue his membership in the team.  











and p= ∑ p
jx
j. If the owner of capital has invested q
j per unit of time in one individual of 
                                                 
18 Buenstorf and Fornahl (2009) note that it is possible that some inappropriate choices 
were made while constituting the team initially. This leads to some reduction in 
synergies.When this is discovered subsequently there may be no way of 
accommodating that team member. The original team management may not be in a 
position to use his services by forming another complementary team either. As such, 
that individual would be asked to leave the team.  
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j .  
Proposition 5 Suppose α = β. Assume that q
j>(1−α)x
α−1
j , i.e; an individual of talent j is 
costly to the current team. The owner can share a part of the capital cost and maintain 
control in the spinoff firm  if that team member has the entrepreneurial talent to start the 




j . Then, w
j=αx
α−1








and qjr ≤ (1-s)pj where q
jr is the capital cost burden borne by the spinoff and s represents 
the share of profits of the spinoff firm claimed by the owner of the original firm.. Surely 




j due to scale effects makes spinoff a superior organizational 
arrangement. The Tremcar case presented in section 6 is along these lines. 
Several other contexts which motivate a spinoff are discernible. First, the owner may 
ask a member of the team to leave if it improves the synergies of the team and thereby 
enables him to offer higher wages to all the other members that remain with the team. 
Second, a particular individual may be asked to leave if the cost of maintaining him within 
the  team  is  higher  than  his  contribution  to  profit.  The  distressed  individual  may  have 
enough entrepreneurial talent to create a spinoff. Third, the owners may encourage spinoffs 
by  team  members  who  have  entrepreneurial  talent  if  it  is  possible  to  improve 
organizational synergy. The owner may maintain adequate control by providing capital and 
markets for the products of the spinoff firm.  
4  Pre- and Post- Spinoff Organization 
Baccara and Razin (2007) noted that the structure of the old team and the nature of the 
innovation  determine  the  motivation  to  spinoff.  However,  they  acknowledge  that  the 
organization of the new team will also have a decisive influence on the spinoff generation 
and on the spinoff firm’s stability and efficiency. This section examines the nature of the 
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spinoff  by  considering  organizational  dissonance  and  synergy  exhibited  by  team 
production functions prior to and after the spinoff.  
           As noted earlier, the efficient structure of an organization depends on its activities 
and  size.  A  common  observation  is  that  small  local  stores,  with  possibly  one  talent 
organizing it, are quite efficient. However, as Danzon et al (2005) noted, there may be a 
tendency to employ more than necessary talents as a market premptive measure. Such 
choices lead to organizational dissonance. Some spinoffs and smaller team formation may 
lead to synergies. 
     Organizational synergies or dissonance is an indicator of overall peformance. Spinoffs 
depend on how they translate into gains to specific individuals in the team. 
     These two aspects must be kept in perspective while examining spinoff possibilities if 
there is organizational dissonance apriori. 
      If a person of talent j leaves the team and starts another one on his own, he has to 
assemble  a  new  team  to  organize  the  production  activity  efficiently  and  to  capture 
synergies.  The  increase  in  wages  post  spinoff  is  the  payment  for  these  organizational 
capabilities. This is reflected in the changes in the production function brought about by 
the spinoff team. To achieve a general result it is sufficient to consider a team of three 
different talents where two of them create a synergy and the third creates some dissonance. 
The following proposition holds. 
Proposition 5 Organizational dissonance apriori and synergies after spinoff are necessary 
to justify a spinoff.  
Proof: Assume that x1,x2, and x3 constitute a team initially and organizational dissonance is 
discernible. That is, the production function is 
 y = (∑xj
β)
α/β ; α < β 
Will an individual from x
3 spinoff?  It can be surmised that x
3 requires the same team 
to carry on production if he decides to spinoff. Hence, wages paid to an individual of talent 
3 after spinoff, w
3s=w
3. Consequently individuals of the highest level of talent are not 
likely  to  spinoff.  For,  identifying  the  source  of  dissonance  and  correcting  it  may  be 
expensive. 
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Will an individual from x




α/β -1 . Post spinoff, he can form a team consisting of x
2 and x
1 only. One 
possibility is that the smaller team enjoys synergies. In such a case, the production function 
will be y = (x1
β + x2
β)
γ/β ; γ > β. The corresponding w
2s will be γ(x1
β + x2
β)
γ/β. It is then 





γ/β – 1 > α (∑xj
β)
α/β - 1. It can be readily verified that it 
will be satisfied whenever γ > β > α. It follows that x
2 gains by spinoff. 
Will an individual from x
1 spinoff ?  Let the production function post spinoff be y=x
α
1. 




α/β  - 1 and 
wages post spinoff = w
1s= αx
α−1




β) since α < β. 
This  inequality  holds  by  assumption
19.  Hence,  so  long  as  such  individuals  have  the 
organizational talent to achieve synergies, they will spinoff. It must be noted that after the 
spinoff even the other members of the team will be paid higher wages. This is perfectly 
consistent with the experiences of startups in the Silicon Valley. 
When  we  specifically  term  talent  to  achieve  synergy  as  entrepreneurial  talent  then 
individuals of talent j have entrepreneurial talent a
j such that a
1<a
2<a
3 = 1. The production 
function is then modified as y=a
1x
α
1. With this setting, w
1s<w
1 is possible. That is, these 
individuals will not spinoff purely because they do not have the organizational capabilities 
to achieve synergy. The following observations are therefore pertinent. (a) The worker 
with the highest level of talent cannot work without getting the rest of the team together. 
Hence, he is not likely to spinoff. (b) Workers with lower talents will spinoff only if they 
can create smaller teams and achieve synergies. (c) Workers with the least talent have 
neither the talent to put the requisite team together nor can they obtain complementary 
resources like capital and finances. They do not spinoff. (d) In this model, spinoff is driven 
by wage payments. Hence, wage reductions that result from organizational dissonance is 
the basic disagreement that explains spinoffs. (e) Dissonance alone will not be sufficient 
for spinoff. Instead entrepreneurial talent is necessary to ensure synergies after the spinoff. 
                                                 
19  Suppose the production function post spinoff is y = x1
γ ; γ > α. It can be readily 
verified that this result is valid. 
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     Another possible reason for the lack of synergies in large teams could be as follows. On 
the one hand, if a team has the correct mix of talents, the elasticity of substitution between 
them will be low. On the other hand, there will be greater substitution possibilities in teams 
which  exhibit  organizational  dissonance.  That  is,  after  the  spinoff  the  new  team  may 
exhibit a lower value of β whatever the α may be. Clearly, the possibility of spinoff from 
team members belonging to x2 or x1 persists. 
5  Quality Ideas and Spinoffs 
Over time, with accumulated knowledge and experience, some individuals may get new 
ideas which may be in the form of new techniques for improvements in existing products 
or developing new products. If the team member with a new idea can convince the existing 
team that the new idea is profitable and organizationally feasible, the team may agree to 
compensate the innovator adequately by offering a share of monopoly rents so that the 
innovator stays with the team. There may be disagreements between the innovator team 
member and rest of the team if the team is not convinced about the economic value of the 
innovation and/or their ability to implement it within the team. Furthermore, there may be 
disagreements about adequate compensation even if the team agrees to implement the new 
idea. Such possibilities may trigger a spinoff. Spinoff by a team member with a new idea is 
inevitable  if  there  is  organizational  dissonance  and  the  rest  of  the  team  feels  that 
dissonance cannot be reined in even after the introduction of the new innovation. The 
analysis of these cases follows from the results of the two earlier sections. 
However, some new possibilities necessitate further analysis. For example, if the team 
member with a new idea does not have the requisite entrepreneurial abilities a spinoff may 
not materialize unless the idea is very promising. Another possibility is that although, there 
is organizational synergy ex ante, expected organizational dissonance post spinoff will 
inhibit spinoff. However, the outcome will depend on the quality of the new idea. The team 
member  with  a  new  idea  may  find  it  difficult  to  achieve  the  necessary  coordination 
required for implementation of the idea within the new team. The expected probability of 
success of the new idea along with the quality of the idea determines the possibility of 
spinoff. Note that the new idea does not necessarily improve the intrinsic talents of the 
team members. Instead, it will either improve the productivity of each of them or provide 
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better  returns  due  to  improvement  in  the  product.  Assume  that  the  team  consists  of  n 




α/β.  If  the  current  team  incorporates  the  innovation,  without  sacrificing  its 
synergies, the production function can be written as  
  y=τ.( ∑ x
β
j)
α/β   
where τ is the extent of productivity gain from the innovative idea. The synergies expected 
from implementing such new ideas are least conducive to spinoff. This would be especially 
so if the team agrees to absorb the new idea. Thus the following proposition follows. 
Proposition 6 Suppose there is organizational dissonance after the spinoff. The spinoff 
will not be worthwhile if the productivity gains from the quality of new ideas are not 
adequately large.  
Proof: Assume that the original team did not agree to incorporate the innovative idea. This 
motivates the individual to spinoff and to form a new team. There is nothing new to prove 
if organizational synergies can be established after the spinoff, as the spinoff is always 
worthwhile to the innovator if τ>1. Hence, let us assume that dissonance is expected after 
the  spinoff.  The  new  production  function  will  be  y  = τ  (∑xj
β)
γ/β  =  τys  ;  γ  <  β.  If  the 
individual representing x
n=1 is the source of the innovative idea and creates the spinoff, 
then the wages to x
n before and after the spinoff will be wn = αyxn
β-1/∑xj
β and      
wns = τγxn
β-1ys/∑xj
β ; γ < α, and ys < y respectively. When will be w
ns<w
n?  Invoking the 
result that yτ>y
s, we must have α/γ = τ*. 
Hence, the individual of talent n will not find it advantageous to spinoff if τ<τ
*. In 
other words, a spinoff will occur if τ is large enough even when there is organizational 
dissonance after the spinoff. 
However, note that an increase in the marginal product, and the consequent possibility 
of spinoff do not depend on an increase in output. This necessitates reexamination of two 
issues:  (a)  Is  the  wage  earned  by  the  innovator  the  best  criterion  to  determine  the 
motivation to spinoff?  and (b) will it be socially efficient to allow spinoffs triggered by 
higher wages if they do not result in increased output?  We considered the worst case 
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scenario ex post. Perhaps the organizational dissonance post spinoff will not be as severe 
as this. 
 Observe that the introduction of the new idea within the existing team may be the 
source of dissonance and spinoff. A spinoff firm may be in a position to restore synergies 
as well as gain from the higher productivity. This case does not warrant further analysis. 
6  Three Examples 
The three examples in this section support the theoretical arguments presented in the 
earlier sections. The basic point in presenting these examples is to demonstrate the role of 
organizational dissonance and synergies in the formation of spinoffs. However, they do not 
satisfy  all  the  underlying  assumptions  of  the  models.  Conversely,  it  is  also  true  that 
economic theory cannot incorporate all the features present in any realistic experience. 
A team is formed to achieve synergies. However it is possible that the right individuals 
are not chosen. External forces such as the availability of new ideas, new avenues for 
growth  or  wrong  execution  of  ideas  may  trigger  spinoff  from  a  team.  The  context  of 
Procter & Gamble Godrej (PGG), as outlined in Karmali (1996), vividly illustrates this. 
Before teaming up with P&G, Godrej Soaps was India’s second largest seller of soaps 
after Hindustan Lever. Marketing is one of the essential functions in selling soaps and 
maintaining market shares. The marketing team of Godrej had a sales team of 550 people 
and 3000 wholesale distributors. In all, their distribution network had a coverage extending 
to nearly 2 million retail outlets. However, Godrej had a significant unused capacity in 
manufacturing.  They  were  forced  to  utilize  it  in  manufacturing  soaps  for  Johnson  & 
Johnson and Reckitt & Colman. It made sense for them to induct P&G into their team to 
fully  utilize  manufacturing  capacity  on  a  long  term  basis  since  P&G  had  international 
brand names like Camay. 
P&G expected some synergies as well. P&G, like most other soap manufacturers in the 
world, was using beef tallow as a primary ingredient. Since the Indian government banned 
the use of beef tallow P&G could expect to enter the market only through an alternative 
manufacturing method. Godrej was already using vegetable oils like palm oil and rice bran 
oil. One synergy for P&G was the benefit of Godrej Soaps’ expertise in vegetable oil 
technology. Further, it could avoid a long gestation time necessary to put up a soap factory 
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by teaming up with Godrej. It would have taken P&G a considerable amount of time and 
resources to set up their own distribution team as well. The collaboration of P&G and 
Godrej meant that Godrej got access to multinational marketing prowess, while Procter got 
plugged  into  a  strong  mainline  manufacturing  and  distribution  team.  Within  the  team, 
Godrej had the sole responsibility of soap manufacturing. P&G had absolutely no control 
over the costs. This generated disagreement that Godrej was extracting monopoly rents and 
inflating costs. Second, Godrej sold off some of its brands to P&G because P&G did not 
want some Godrej brands like their detergent Trilo to compete with their brands like Ariel. 
In exchange, P&G agreed to market Godrej’s Cinthol in global markets. P&G never really 
fulfilled this promise. Godrej management deeply resented what they saw as Procter’s 
willful neglect of their brands that they built up over the years. Among all these reasons, 
the  most  important  was  the  clash  of  organizational  cultures.  Godrej  executives  were 
accustomed to introducing new products on the basis of gut feelings and selling them 
through  emotive  and  esoteric  appeals.  They  believed  that  in  India  soaps  sell  more  on 
imagery than on the platform of product benefits. P&G, on the other hand, was more 
concerned  about  functional  propositions  and  a  calculative  long  term  approach.  Senior 
Godrej executives resented P&G’s change in emphasis. As Karmali (1996) put it, “Having 
run a successful soap business for years, they felt that they know more about it anyway and 
did not welcome Procter’s tutoring.” Further, Godrej managers depended mostly on their 
practical  experience  in  proposing  and  approving  changes.  More  often  than  not,  final 
decisions  had  to  be  made  by  top  level  management.  P&G  management  was  more 
calculated and based on scientific management principles. This resulted in delays in getting 
any decisions approved. Organizational dissonance was evident. 
Karmali (1996, p.60) summed up the lack of synergies succinctly. “Procter on its part 
had  gained  distribution  strengths  but  found  itself  locked  into  an  unsustainable 
manufacturing agreement and a joint venture that was losing money. Godrej felt let down 
on two counts: The capacity was not being utilized as guaranteed and more crucially, 
Procter’s marketing prowess was not delivering any benefit to Godrej’s painstakingly built 
portfolio of brands.” 
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In  essence,  the  team  formation  was  based  on  some  expected  synergies  in 
manufacturing and distribution. However, the new team organization could not avoid some 
unforeseen organizational dissonance. A spinoff from the team was inevitable. 
The  second  example  pertains  to  the  context  of  a  voluntary  spinoff.    Tremcar,  a 
Canadian  firm  in  the  milk  transportation  business  produces  steel  tanker  trucks.  The 
essential aspects to ensure the success of their business are components manufacturing, an 
assembly  shop,  attending  to  warranties,  after-sales  service  and  repairs.  All  the  major 
activities were initially under the supervision of Tremblay. 
However, the owner of the original team felt that he could not manage a large team as 
the volume of business increased. He knew that some of his employees had entrepreneurial 
talents and first hand knowledge of business acquired from the experience of working with 
them. He spunoff activities into new firms with his employees as major owners. Their 
production  complemented  his  activity.  From  the  viewpoint  of  the  present  study, 
independence in the modules of production was at the apex of efficient spinoffs.
20  
As  the  business  grew  manifold  in  a  few  years,  Tremblay  felt  the  need  to  form  a 
separate unit to deal with after-sales service. However, he knew that it would be virtually 
impossible  to  sell  tankers  unless  a  high  level  of  after-sales  service  is  provided.  In 
Tremblay’s mind he was clear that the spinoff must have the expertise and knowledge of 
the business, should exhibit entrepreneurial talents, and possess leadership qualities and 
energetic  dynamism.  Herbert,  who  worked  with  Tremblay  for  nearly  25  years,  always 
dreamed of having his own business. He was an ideal choice for a spinoff. His new firm, 
Herbert & Son, has taken over the business of the sales agent for the tankers, servicing, 
warranties and repairs. 
The  next  issue  was  about  the  manufacturing  of  components.  This  involved  the 
additional problem of setting up a separate production unit. Ostiguy was an employee of 
Tremcar who was constantly on the look out for new projects and challenges. Tremblay 
allowed Ostiguy to create a spinoff, Raynox, to manufacture all the requisite components. 
Tremcar retained some control through equity participation and providing the necessary 
technical support. 
                                                 
20 The following presentation is based on Mireault (2003). 
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The growth in the market also meant geographic spread of the use of tankers supplied 
by Tremcar. It was no longer possible for Herbert & Son to do the job. Tremblay found 
another of his employees, Robillard, who willingly created a spinoff, JC Tanks & Repairs, 
in western Canada. 
In sum, Tremcar was instrumental in spotting the modularity and the entrepreneurial 
talents  of  its  employees  and  encouraged  the  creation  of  spinoffs.  Tremblay  preferred 
spinoffs  to  subcontracting  primarily  to  ensure  the  availability  of  technical  experience, 
entrepreneurial talent and trust above everything else.
21 
The third example relates to the role of outsourcing which has been quite prominent for 
a long time. Usually a production or marketing team would prefer to outsource some of its 
activities  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  First,  they  cannot  fully  utilize  the  talents  of  an 
entrepreneur who can cater to their requirements due to their small scale. It is also possible 
that the requirements are of a short- term nature and long term commitments may not be 
efficient. Second, the organizational rearrangement necessary to accommodate that activity 
within the existing team may be extensive. An entrepreneur may not be willing to forego 
his  freedom  unless  the  expected  returns  warrant  it.  The  other  thing  is  that  it  may  be 
possible to utilize his talent to cater to the needs of other teams as well because the original 
team will grow over time and may integrate with other teams. Regaining synergies is an 
essential aspect of integration among teams. The classic example of the Fisher Body vs. 
General Motors relationship is illustrative of some of the aspects described above.
22 
Fisher Body(FB), owned and operated by Fisher brothers was producing car bodies for 
several assemblers including General Motors(GM) and Ford.
23 FB created all the capital 
assets that were necessary for their manufacturing operations. The major reason was that 
the capital assets were not exclusive to the requirements of GM. FB and GM entered into 
two agreements in 1919. (a) GM bought a 60 percent equity stake in FB. However, GM 
was not allowed to exercise any decision making controls that may be detrimental to the 
minority  shareholders.  (b)  The  ten  year  manufacturing  agreement  had  the  following 
                                                 
21  The workers could not have contemplated and succeeded in the spinoff on their own 
despite their entrepreneurial drive in the present case. The original owner pushing them 
off was necessary. 
22 The most significant studies along these lines are (Coase, 2000, 2006; Goldberg, 
2008; Klein, 2007; Klein et al., 1978). 
23  Goldberg (2008) contains a description of the various clauses in the agreement. 
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clauses. (1) GM will buy substantially all its car bodies from FB. (2) GM will furnish FB 
its quantity requirements, time schedules, and places of delivery. (3) FB will, immediately 
upon receipt of these requirements, notify acceptance or otherwise. (4) If FB is unable to 
comply GM may buy elsewhere or construct facilities to make sure that its production 
schedules are not disrupted. (5) FB may also sell car bodies to other assemblers like Ford. 
(6) The prices that GM paid for car bodies of FB were calculated by using a 17.6 percent 
markup over the operating and transportation costs incurred by FB. Since FB creates and 
operates  the  necessary  capital  equipment,  this  markup  was  expected  to  offer  them  an 
adequate return.
24 
As Coase(2000, p.24) pointed out, this agreement brought about an unsatisfactory long-
term  relationship  with  FB.  The  Fisher  brothers  tended  to  concentrate  on  their  body-
building business with other assemblers and paid less attention to the needs of GM than 
GM would have liked. A partial solution was implemented in 1922. GM tried to establish 
higher  synergies  with  FB  by  appointing  Fred  Fisher  as  a  member  of  the  executive 
committee of GM. By 1924, when their employment contract with FB expired, all the 
Fisher brothers joined GM. They were, as a result, members of the GM team.
25 
Late in 1925, General Motors, as a part of its expansion plan, wanted to close the FB 
plant in Detroit and build a new body plant in Flint, near its assembly plant. FB objected to 
this. They wanted to expand their Detroit plant because FB had customers other than GM 
and it would have been less costly to supply them from Detroit rather than Flint. The added 
disincentive was that they would lose on the markup on transportation costs embodied in 
the  original  GM  agreement  if  they  relocated  to  Flint.  Coase  (2000,pg.28)  noted  the 
following viewpoint of Sloan who was then the president of GM. “ We were establishing 
throughout the country assembly plants … and where we had a chasis plant, we had to 
                                                 
24  It will be noted presently that including transportation costs was perhaps a mistake. 
Klein (1988) was explicit in stating that they were included in costs for purposes of the 
agreement. 
25 Coase (2000) is of the opinion that they did so voluntarily. Hence, it cannot be 
claimed that it was forced on them because they tried to holdup GM. (Klein et al., 
1978; Klein, 2007), on the other hand, suggests that a holdup did occur despite this 
because FB refused to locate a plant at Flint in 1925. This debate is of very little 
consequence for the purpose at hand. 
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have a Fisher Body plant but the Fisher Body Corporation was unwilling to put in an 
investment in these assembly plants. That handicapped us considerably.” 
In 1926, GM acquired the rest of the 40 percent equity stake held by FB. However, 
they retained all the Fisher brothers as their employees. In other words, GM merged the 
teams  soon  after  they  discovered  discord  or  disagreement.  The  new  team  with  all  the 
manufacturing talents in place created a body plant in Flint by the end of 1926. 
For all practical purposes, it should be noted that GM and FB started as different teams 
because they expected disadvantages of a joint team. GM made some mistakes in drawing 
up the agreement. There was some dissonance in operating the two teams independently. 
This, along with the expanding business of GM made it more economical to merge the 
teams.
26 Clearly, they expected synergies in doing so. As Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber 
(2000)  argued,  this  merger  brought  about  improving  coordination  of  production  and 
inventories, assured GM of an adequate supply of car bodies and provided access to the 
manufacturing and executive talents of Fisher brothers. 
7  Conclusion 
This  paper  proposes  organizational  production  functions  as  a  useful  tool  for  the 
analysis of a variety of spinoffs. The framework is rich enough to explain several stylized 
facts recorded in the literature. However, some issues require further attention. 
It was noted at the outset that team synergy may depend on two other factors that have 
not been explicitly incorporated in the organizational production function. First, it was 
acknowledged that managerial allocation of capital and other resources to different talents 
in the team affect the output of the team. Second, managerial attitudes, reflected in the 
independence they offer to team members and equity in the distribution of gains, define the 
environment which determines compliance to team goals and the associated synergies. Αn 
organizational production function approach may incorporate the second aspect to some 
extent. However, the first aspect necessitates further analysis.  
     However, the fact that a competitive product can be introduced even though the original 
team refused to accept it because it cannibalizes the demand for the current product is a 
crucial aspect. In that case, the spinoff gains at the expense of the original team. Usually 
                                                 
26  Klein (2002)[p.64] makes this point explicitly. 
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the spinoff must finance its activities from sources outside the team. A spinoff may be 
based  entirely  on  the  possibility  that  stakeholders  are  convinced  about  the  greater 
probability of success of spinoff team. The rate of profit, return on investment and stock 
market reaction to new public offerings may be crucial determinants of spinoff. A more 
detailed analytical framework is necessary to explore these aspects. 
As a practical reality, a spinoff firm may not produce a similar product and it may not 
have a similar organizational structure. Given such heterogeneity, there is a need to specify 
common grounds to offer the basis of comparisons. Perhaps the rate of profit and the rate 
of return on investment provide such measures. The problem would then be to identify the 
advantages for the individual who initiated the spinoff in the first instance. On occasions, 
individuals may leave a team and join another existing team because the other team is 
willing to accept new ideas. 
Though  the  generic  forms  of  the  production  function  developed  in  this  study  are 
adequate, the details in any one specific case may have its own idiosyncrasies. The sheer 
variety of causes and experiences of spinoffs make it difficult to suggest an all inclusive 
theoretical framework. Perhaps the best that can be done is to exhibit a rich variety of 
alternative theoretical structures from which one can be chosen to suit the given context.  
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